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Abstract: One of the most original contributions to the 
optimism debate of the eighteenth century was put for-
ward by the maverick French Enlightenment thinker, An-
dré-Pierre Le Guay de Prémontval (1716-1764), in an es-
say entitled “General misunderstanding on the question of 
optimism” (published 1757). This essay, which seeks to 
develop a “middle point” between the polarized pro- and 
anti-optimist positions that characterized the optimism 
debate, prefigures the development of process or neoclas-
sical theism in important ways. The essay is presented he-
re in English for the first time, along with an analysis of 
the essay itself and of the context in which it was written. 
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Introduction 
 
We are fortunately in an age which recognizes that note-
worthy and original philosophical contributions were not 
the exclusive preserve of so-called canonical thinkers. 
One such contribution is to be found in the essay which is 
the focus of this paper, namely “General misunderstand-
ing on the question of optimism” by the maverick French 
Enlightenment thinker, André-Pierre Le Guay de 
Prémontval (1716-1764). The essay was written sometime 
between the second half of 1755 and 1757, at a time when 
the question of optimism, that is, whether our world is the 
best possible, was much agitated, especially in Germany, 
where Prémontval had resided since 1752. By way of an 
introduction to this text, which is presented here in Eng-
lish for the first time, I shall provide a short account of 
Prémontval’s career in Berlin’s Royal Academy of Sci-
ences and Belles-Lettres (section I), followed by an ac-
count of the Academy prize question on optimism, which 
served as a stimulus for Prémontval’s essay (section II), 
and lastly an analysis of the essay itself (section III). A 
complete English translation of the essay is provided as 
an appendix. 
 
 
I. Prémontval and the Berlin Academy 
 
Prior to his arrival in Berlin in 1752, Prémontval had led 
an interesting if undistinguished life. In 1737, at the age 
of 21, he made something of a name for himself as a self-
styled Professor of Mathematics in his home city of Paris, 
offering free lectures on arithmetic, algebra, and geometry 
in a room in his own house. These ended in 1744 where 
he departed for Switzerland, and over the next eight years 
he would move to Germany and then to Holland, support-
ing himself by working as a proof-reader and publishing a 
number of books, such as L’esprit de Fontenelle [The 
Spirit of Fontenelle] (1744),1 a selection of choice ex-
tracts from Fontenelle’s writings, Memoires [Memoirs] 
(1749),2 Panagiana panurgica, ou le faux evangeliste 
[Rascal Panage, or the False Evangelist] (1750),3 a viru-
lent critique of François Vincent Toussaint’s book Les 
moeurs [Manners] (1748),4 and lastly a 3-volume work 
entitled La Monogamie [Monogamy] (1751-2),5 featuring 
a defence of the traditional institution of marriage against 
various scriptural and philosophical arguments in favour 
of polygamy. While living in The Hague, Prémontval’s 
wife received an offer of employment from Princess Wil-
helmina of Hesse-Kassel (1726-1808), which prompted 
the couple to depart for a new life in Berlin on 14 Feb-
ruary 1752. 
On the strength of his published work, Prémontval 
was nominated as a member of the Royal Academy of 
Sciences and Belles-Lettres shortly after his arrival in 
Berlin. The Academy had started life as the Royal Society 
of Sciences, founded in 1700 by polymath Gottfried Wil-
helm Leibniz (1646-1716), but for decades was plagued 
by insufficient funding and poor leadership. The Society’s 
fortunes changed dramatically in 1740 following a sweep-
ing reorganization by the Prussian king Frederick II 
(1712-1786), which brought in renowned figures such as 
Pierre-Louis Maupertuis (1698-1759), as perpetual presi-
dent, and mathematician Leonhard Euler (1707-1783), 
and saw the approval of new statutes and funding as well 
as the creation of an annual prize essay contest on a topic 
selected by the Academy’s members. In 1743 the Society 
was renamed the Royal Academy of Sciences and Belles-
Lettres, and its members were divided into four classes: 
experimental philosophy, mathematics, speculative phi-
losophy, and belles-lettres. Although the works he had 
published prior to his arrival in Berlin would have made 
Prémontval a good fit in the class of belles-lettres, he 
opted instead to join the class of speculative philosophy,6 
explaining that this reflected an interest in metaphysics he 
had been cultivating for twenty years.7 
Prémontval became a full member of the Academy on 
29 June 1752, and a week later delivered his inaugural 
lecture, or memoir, a rather fawning speech in which he 
gave lengthy praise to the Academy, the talents of the 
other academicians, and the merits of Frederick II.8 
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Prémontval’s second memoir, delivered 19 October 1752, 
was nowhere near as anodyne. Entitled “A preliminary 
memoir on the difficulties against the existence of God,” 
it concerned the question of whether it was permissible to 
raise objections against proofs (or even accepted “truths”) 
that one does not know how to resolve.9 The aim of such 
an exercise, Prémontval explained, was to clear away bad 
proofs and thus inspire the invention of new solutions in 
order to put the truths on a firmer footing. Despite its title, 
Prémontval’s main target in this memoir was not the 
“truth” of the existence of God per se, but rather one of 
the most popular proofs used to establish it, a proof that 
today would fall within the class of arguments called de-
sign arguments. The memoir culminated with Prémontval 
attacking a variation of the proof developed by Mauper-
tuis,10 based on the principle of least action, a principle 
that Maupertuis himself had discovered. 
The brazen attack on both the Academy’s president 
(whose patronage Prémontval enjoyed) as well as a highly 
respected proof for God’s existence set a precedent for 
what was to follow. Within eighteen months, Prémontval 
had delivered stinging attacks on the thought of the two 
most renowned figures of German philosophy at the time, 
namely Leibniz and Christian Wolff (1679-1754), accus-
ing the former of fatalism and the latter of basing his phi-
losophy on circular definitions.11 The frontal assault on 
Wolff is all the more surprising given the support that 
Wolff commanded in the Academy, not least in the form 
of its perpetual secretary, Samuel Formey (1711-1797). 
Not wishing to spare any of the Academy’s heavyweights, 
Prémontval also initiated a short-lived but fractious ex-
change with Leonard Euler about the latter’s attempt to 
deduce God’s existence from the structure of the human 
eye, with which Prémontval was decidedly unimpressed.12 
In another series of memoirs entitled Pensées sur la 
liberté [Thoughts on Freedom], Prémontval identified 
numerous difficulties in supposing that human free will 
was compatible with the traditional notion of God, diffi-
culties he deliberately left unresolved. 
Prémontval’s preparedness to unsettle deep-seated be-
liefs and his unwillingness to respect reputations did not 
sit well with his fellow academicians, who often over-
looked his work for publication in the Academy’s annual 
proceedings, the Histoire de l’Académie Royale des Sci-
ences et des Belles-Lettres de Berlin. As the Academy 
seemed happy to let Prémontval deliver his memoirs but 
not publish them, he felt compelled to make alternative 
arrangements for their dissemination. This led him to pub-
lish no fewer than six books between 1754 and 1757.13 
The first of these, appearing in March 1754,14 was 
Thoughts on Freedom, which drew together three mem-
oirs of the same name that had been delivered at the 
Academy shortly before.15 Two further books followed in 
1754, Le Diogene de d’Alembert; ou Diogene decent [The 
Diogenes of d’Alembert, or, Decent Diogenes],16 and De 
Dieu & de la Religion [On God and Religion],17 both of 
which were short compilations of discrete articles, rang-
ing from a single sentence to several pages in length, on a 
variety of subjects.18 In March 1755 Prémontval pub-
lished a further provocative work entitled Du hazard sous 
l’empire de la providence [On Chance under the Rule of 
Providence],19 in which he argued for the reality of 
chance (understood as the exclusion of all necessity and 
intention) in the universe. All four of these books were 
envisaged as part of—or spin-offs from—a larger series 
entitled Philosophiques protestations et declarations 
[Philosophical Protestations and Declarations]. 
Prémontval’s initial plan (in 1754) was that one volume 
of this series would be published each year, with the first 
one to be entitled Academic Works, rounding up all of the 
memoirs he had delivered at the Academy.20 However, a 
bout of ill-health led to delays in publication,21 and when 
the first two volumes did finally appear in 1757 they did 
not correspond to what Prémontval had originally envis-
aged.22 Now entitled Vues Philosophiques; ou protesta-
tions et declarations sur les principaux objets des con-
noissances humaines [Philosophical Views, or Protesta-
tions and Declarations on the Principle Objects of Hu-
man Knowledge],23 the two volumes contained a mixture 
of writings: nestling alongside a selection of some of the 
memoirs he had delivered at the Academy were a few 
specially-written essays, a number of letters, and extracts 
from two of his earlier books, Memoirs and Diogenes. 
Courting controversy once more, Prémontval rather pro-
vocatively described the essence of his Philosophical 
Views as “Universal Protestantism,”24 even though he 
there endorsed a very unorthodox conception of God, 
claiming that his God was not outside time, or free, or a 
creator. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Prémontval’s Philosophi-
cal Views was placed on the index of prohibited books in 
1761.25 
Although his spate of book publishing ended in 1757, 
Prémontval continued to be a productive member of the 
Academy until his death in 1764. In his twelve years as a 
member, he attended 356 sessions of the Academy,26 in 
that time delivering 26 memoirs, all bar one of which 
were published. Prémontval also played a full part in the 
intellectual life of the Academy, including sitting on the 
jury on some for the annual prize essay contests, such as 
the 1755 contest on optimism.27 
 
 
II. The Academy Prize Question on Optimism 
 
In the 1740s and 1750s, the anti-Leibnizian faction of the 
Academy, led by Maupertuis and Euler, often used the 
prize contest to solicit (and reward) essays that were criti-
cal of Leibniz’s philosophy. In 1745 Leibniz’s doctrine of 
monads was chosen as the topic of the essay contest; in 
1749 his determinism; and in 1753 it was decided that the 
focus of the contest of 1755 would be optimism; the offi-
cial minutes of the Academy for 7 June 1753 record the 
decision: 
 
The question proposed for the prize of 1755 was stated in these 
terms. 
We request an examination of Pope’s system, contained in the 
proposition “All is good”. 
It is a matter of: (1) determining the true meaning of that propo-
sition according to the hypothesis of its author; (2) comparing it 
with the system of optimism, or the choice of the best, to indi-
cate the connections and differences between them; (3) lastly, to 
put forward arguments that will be thought most fitting to con-
firm or destroy this system.28 
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Announcement of the contest prompted a number of 
complaints. Johann Christoph Gottsched published a short 
tract against what he perceived to be the negative and 
trivializing tone of the Academy’s question.29 Another 
attack came from Gotthold Ephraim Lessing and Moses 
Mendelssohn, who ridiculed the juxtaposition of Pope and 
Leibniz in the Academy’s question, noting that the aims 
and approaches of the poet and philosopher were too dif-
ferent to warrant the sort of comparison the Academy 
proposed.30 Nevertheless, these concerns were not widely 
shared, judging from the number of entries the academy 
received: at least eighteen.31 Of these, only one is known 
to have been sympathetic to optimism,32 this being a 
highly unoriginal piece containing little more than a 
statement of Leibniz’s own arguments for optimism and 
an account of his responses to objections. Despite its lack 
of novelty, this piece won the support of the Academy’s 
small Wolffian contingent, but was eventually awarded 
second place to appease Maupertuis, who had insisted the 
prize be given to an essay critical of Leibniz’s philoso-
phy.33 The prize was thus awarded to the essay by Adolf 
Friedrich Reinhard (1726-1783), chamber secretary to the 
Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz. 
Reinhard’s essay attacked optimism on two fronts. 
The first objection charges that Leibniz’s doctrine strips 
God of free will, while the second is directed at Leibniz’s 
claim that there is a single best possible world, which Re-
inhard dubs “the dogma of the unique greatest perfec-
tion.”34 The first objection focuses on Leibniz’s insistence 
that God’s perfect nature is such that he would choose to 
create no other world than the best, to which Reinhard 
responds: “If God’s perfections contain the determining 
reason of his volitions then there is no longer any free-
dom; all his actions are as necessary as mathematical 
truths.”35 The second objection, which is unique to Rein-
hard, seeks to establish that an intelligent being’s primary 
end, or chief goal, is usually served by multiple secondary 
or tertiary ends, and that all of these ends can be attained 
in many different ways. This is true also for world-
creation, he supposes, since in addition to the many dif-
ferent primary and secondary ends God could propose, 
there are likely many different ways of attaining each and 
every one of them and the optimist is in no position to 
deny that some of these will be just as good as others, 
leading to worlds of equal perfection.36 Hence there is no 
single best world and thus no requirement for God to cre-
ate one world in particular. 
Reinhard’s essay prompted a number of responses. 
The Academy’s perpetual secretary, Samuel Formey, 
found Reinhard’s reasoning so weak that he was unchar-
acteristically moved to insert a critical review of the win-
ning essay in one of the journals under his editorial con-
trol.37 A pre-critical Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) pub-
lished a short essay that sought to show, pace Reinhard, 
that the notion of a single best world was perfectly coher-
ent.38 Prémontval, who was on the voting committee for 
the 1755 prize essay, opted for a more direct approach, 
writing to Reinhard to tell him that despite his misgivings 
about Reinhard’s essay he had voted for it anyway, neg-
lecting to mention that in so doing he had bowed to pres-
sure from Maupertuis.39 Prémontval also sent Reinhard a 
lengthy point-by-point rebuttal of the prize-winning es-
say, later publishing both his letter and his rebuttal in vol-
ume 2 of his Philosophical Views.40 The essay “General 
misunderstanding on the question of optimism” was writ-
ten to serve as a sort of preface to these two pieces, 
Prémontval using the opportunity to sketch out his own 
views and present them as the middle point between the 
sharply pro- or anti-optimist positions he had encountered 
in the essays submitted to the Academy’s prize contest. 
Prémontval was clearly dismayed that no one else had hit 
upon this “middle point”, and this despite him effectively 
outlining it in three of the books he had published be-
tween 1754 and 1755, namely Thoughts on Freedom, The 
Diogenes of d’Alembert, and On Chance under the Rule 
of Providence. Curiously, in the “General misunderstand-
ing” essay he also suggests that this spate of book pub-
lishing was undertaken in the hope that it would lead 
some of the competition’s entrants to arrive at the same 
“middle point” position he favoured, though by his own 
admission this did not happen, the entrants being clearly 
polarized, either fervently in favour of optimism or 
against it. What, then, was Prémontval’s “middle point”? 
 
 
III. Prémontval’s “General misunderstanding on the 
Question of Optimism” 
 
Prémontval reaches his “middle point” by drawing a 
sharp distinction between these two propositions: 
 
(1) God essentially chooses the best among all the possibles. 
(2) The world is the best of all possible worlds. 
 
He rightly notes that those who took part in the optimism 
debate typically conflated the two, or at best construed (2) 
as the logical consequence of (1). Against this, however, 
Prémontval claims that while (1) is necessarily true, (2) is 
completely false. The first proposition must be accepted 
since it is of the essence of an all-wise, all-powerful and 
all-good being to always choose the greatest good or best 
course. But the second proposition must be rejected on 
the grounds that our world could clearly be better, for ex-
ample if a person who has chosen to sin instead chose not 
to sin or if a person who has chosen not to perform a good 
action instead chose to perform it. 
Prémontval harmonizes his acceptance of (1) and re-
jection of (2) by offering a philosophical theology that is 
clearly influenced by Plato’s Timaeus or Timaeus of 
Locri’s On the Nature of the World and the Soul, in par-
ticular by their account of the formation of the cosmos by 
the divine craftsman, the demiurge. Both Plato and the 
author writing as Timaeus of Locri suppose that the 
demiurge acts on pre-existing matter that is by nature dis-
orderly, chaotic, and unpredictable. In conferring order 
upon this material the demiurge seeks to bring about the 
best arrangement, though as the material has natural prop-
erties that are in opposition to the order imposed on it, the 
effects of these properties can only be partially subjugated 
by the demiurge, never wholly eradicated.41 In a similar 
vein, Prémontval envisages God as being faced with a 
world of beings he had not created and over which he 
does not have direct control, though in his account this is 
because some or all of these beings are naturally endowed 
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with free will, which God cannot override or remove even 
if he wanted to. Prémontval identifies God’s principal 
(and indeed overriding) aim as to make all beings holy 
and happy as quickly as possible, on the grounds that no 
other aim is consistent with perfect goodness. But because 
other beings have free will, which is inviolable, God is 
unable to make all happy and holy by fiat. Instead, he is 
restricted to guiding these beings to his goal of universal 
happiness and holiness through the administration of pun-
ishments and rewards. As the universe is still a long way 
from its perfected state, Prémontval rejects the suggestion 
that it is the best possible, opting instead for a more nu-
anced position. While he accepts that the world is the best 
as regards that which depends upon God, who ensures 
that the world contains as much perfection at each mo-
ment as is possible, he holds that it is not best as regards 
that which depends upon free beings, though he envisages 
these beings improving continuously under the guidance 
of God, who seeks to remove as much imperfection from 
the whole as possible. Although Prémontval describes 
himself as an optimist, he is perhaps more accurately de-
scribed as a meliorist, even if there are clear strains of op-
timism in his thought. 
At the heart of Prémontval’s philosophical theology is 
the belief that God’s aim is to make all beings holy and 
happy as quickly as possible.42 He was quite bemused by 
those who insinuated that this might be subordinated to 
some other, more important aim. For example, in his The-
odicy, Leibniz had claimed that while the happiness of 
intelligent beings “is the principal part of God’s design,”43 
it should not be thought that this was his sole aim. Leibniz 
stressed that God would also prize simplicity of means 
and the observation of general laws, intimating that this 
would result in a certain amount of evil (“God can follow 
a simple, productive, regular plan; but I do not believe 
that the best and the most regular is always opportune for 
all creatures simultaneously”).44 In response, Prémontval 
simply notes that it would take just one act of will for 
God to establish as a general law that all be happy and 
holy. Moreover, this act of will would be no more com-
plex than anything else he might will, or, if it was, a per-
fectly good God would not be deterred from it, as nothing 
is more important than the happiness and holiness of his 
creatures. Leibniz and his fellow optimists had therefore 
erred by supposing that God’s wisdom had identified 
more important considerations than the happiness and ho-
liness of other beings. 
On the other hand, opponents of optimism erred by 
denying that God essentially chooses the best. Such a de-
nial typically stemmed from the concern that if God es-
sentially chooses the best then he must do so necessarily, 
which destroys divine freedom at a stroke. To counter 
this, some opponents of optimism, such as Reinhard, in-
sisted that God was entirely free in his choice of world, 
and indeed free to choose whether to create or not, it be-
ing a matter of complete indifference to him whether 
other beings existed or not.45 Prémontval’s response is 
twofold. First, he notes that as goodness is a propensity to 
do good, God’s essential goodness presupposes the exist-
ence of things outside of him to which he can do good, 
implying that it was not up to God whether these things 
existed or not.46 (The same argument would later be used 
by twentieth century process or neoclassical theists to re-
ject the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.)47 Second, Prémont-
val insists that an infinite goodness that was in any way 
indifferent towards the good of other beings was not 
worthy of the name of infinite goodness, or indeed worthy 
of our love. 
For all its ingenuity, Prémontval’s attempt to influence 
the optimist debate was not successful. First and fore-
most, the philosophical theology Prémontval sketched out 
in “General misunderstanding”, and more obliquely in the 
books he published in 1754 and 1755, was too heterodox 
to win widespread support. His rejection of the doctrine 
of creation as an unhelpful theological prejudice would 
have been seen as abhorrent in an age in which orthodoxy 
was still prized. And his claim that God’s principal aim 
was the happiness and holiness of his creatures was at 
odds with the mainstream Christian confessions, which 
typically saw God’s sole aim as the glorification of him-
self, something that was quite compatible with the misery 
and even damnation of many creatures. Prémontval’s 
willingness to consider God’s principal aim to be the hap-
piness and holiness of his creatures would no doubt have 
been seen as the error of a philosopher working out the 
logic of God’s goodness and love independently of any 
other theological or scriptural concerns, which may well 
have been precisely how he arrived at it. As Prémontval 
relates in his memoirs, when he began studying philoso-
phy at the age of 16 or 17 he underwent a crisis of faith 
that led to him to endorse atheistic Pyrrhonism, before 
turning to deism and eventually converting to an unspeci-
fied branch of Protestantism at the age of 30.48 Neverthe-
less, his writings suggest that he continued to entertain a 
philosophical notion of God over one that was recog-
nizably Lutheran or Calvinist, a point that was not lost on 
his critics who castigated him for it.49 But while Prémont-
val’s philosophical theology failed to find adherents in his 
own age, something like it would be entertained again in 
the twentieth century, when similar ideas became key 
planks in process or neoclassical theism.50-51 
 
 
Appendix: Prémontval’s “General Misunderstanding 
on the Question of Optimism”52 
 
There is no subject to which I ought to bring back my re-
ader more frequently, and with more desire to please 
(happy, if I can share this keen interest with him!) than 
that of optimism, or the choice of the best in the action of 
the Supreme Being. I want to speak about it here only 
briefly, to serve as a corrective to the exaggerated judge-
ment of Momus.53 The reader will observe, in a tangible 
way, what I said in the first volume, that such-and-such a 
thought, such-and-such a piece even, which might make 
me appear more than suspect when considered separately, 
changes in nature entirely when considered in the com-
pany of all my ideas.54 
This profane mocker of optimism is perhaps its most 
zealous partisan, provided that the system is considered 
properly and that nothing therein gets confused, which, 
indeed, is very rare, not to mention unprecedented. I do 
not know anyone who does not go too far by extending 
the idea of optimism from God’s action to the perfection 
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of the world, as though the world, or this collection of an 
infinity of beings that modify themselves and each other 
as best they can, was, in all its modifications, the result of 
God’s action alone. There is no one, then, who does not 
completely confuse these two propositions: 
 
God essentially chooses the best among all the possibles. 
The world is the best of all possible worlds. 
 
Or else they are distinguished at most only as a very le-
gitimate conclusion and its immediate premise.55 In my 
opinion, however, these two propositions are so different 
and so far from being connected or related in any way 
that I take the second to be of the highest degree of 
falsity, and the opinion which maintains it for the most 
complete philosophical delirium. It’s the false Minerva, 
object of Momus’ taunts.56 The other I take as a truth so 
obvious, and at the same time so necessary and so sacred, 
that to form the slightest doubt about it is, it seems to me, 
the same as renouncing the idea of God. Although this is 
not the place to enter in this matter, a little elaboration 
will not be inappropriate. 
The world is the best of all possible worlds: that is to 
say that the sequence of all past, present and future events 
is the one which contained the least evil and the most 
good possible, both physical and moral. 
Let’s restrict ourselves to the latter, which is much 
more important. 
Is it to say, then, that if a single one of the depraved 
men who from the beginning of the world have not fol-
lowed the light of reason, nor listened to the reproaches of 
their conscience, had come to change his conduct, then 
the world would have been of lesser worth? That is, that if 
all those to whom we preach to convert or will preach to 
convert, and who will not do anything about it, came to 
do so, the world would lose much thereby? 
Let someone come out with as many platitudes as he 
likes: I will not give up the view that infinite wisdom 
would be mocking us. If we do not obey it when it urges 
us to conform to its laws by the voice of conscience or by 
that of its ministers, one of two things is true: either that 
the thing is not possible in any world, or that this im-
provement of all as we are would spoil and corrupt this 
excellent world in which it has placed us. And what shall 
we say about the justice that punishes us? Of the good-
ness, of the infinite goodness, which calmly sees us pun-
ished for not having done what is not possible in any 
world, or what is not possible in the best? For not having 
done what would change the best to the point of it no 
longer being the best? On the contrary, for having done 
what is essential to the best? For having done what makes 
it the best? 
It is therefore an egregious falsehood to claim that this 
world is the best possible, or even, in milder and more 
modest terms, the least bad. The smallest good action that 
we can perform but don’t, would make it better. The most 
trivial crime, the slightest error into which we could 
avoiding falling but into which we do fall, makes it 
worse. And to make it worse, or not to contribute to mak-
ing it better, as we are able to do, is what makes us 
worthy of punishment. 
Let’s look at the other proposition. 
God essentially chooses the best among all the possibles: 
that is, the being that is essentially all-good, all-wise, and 
all-powerful, essentially chooses, in everything it does, 
the greatest good, both morally and physically; it loves 
this greatest good as essentially as it knows it, and no for-
eign force is capable of diverting it therefrom. 
That is to say that the being which, inasmuch as it is 
essentially all-good, essentially loves the greatest good 
known to it, and inasmuch as it is essentially all-wise, es-
sentially knows the greatest good it is possible to realize, 
and which, moreover, inasmuch as it is essentially all-
powerful, is essentially master of realizing that greatest 
good, that best, which is known to it and which it loves 
essentially. That is to say, then, that this being, infinitely 
exempt both from error and from constraint, will not 
scorn what it loves nor disregard what it knows. 
That is to say, once more, that its complaisance, its 
choice, its action, will not ungenerously stop at a degree 
inferior to this one. 
Thus, it is very false (despite what unquestionably the 
majority of theologians and philosophers dares to main-
tain), it is a falsehood beyond all expression, that the ac-
tion of divine beneficence can stop, and actually be 
stopped, with complaisance and by choice, in everything 
it has done, at a degree infinitely inferior to the supreme 
degree of excellence; consequently, at a puny and miser-
able degree in comparison with an infinity of other de-
grees it sees as possible. 
And it is also very false that such a goodness would 
deserve gratitude, unless it is for not having done worse. 
For myself, although on a few occasions in my life I 
had the misfortune to seriously doubt the existence of a 
God because of cruel prejudices which grew in my mind 
at the time and eclipsed the purest light of day,57 I have 
never had the misfortune to doubt for a single moment 
that if there does exist a God – a being endowed with om-
nipotence and which is as essentially good as intelligent – 
then this being is bound to love, choose, and do the best 
as essentially as he knows it. But how to reconcile the ne-
cessary, indispensable truth of this proposition, God es-
sentially chooses the best, with the manifest falseness of 
this one, this world is the best that was possible?... I do 
not see that anyone has even had the opportunity of think-
ing of attempting it. 
Without exception, all those who have felt the falsity 
of the assertion of the best world, have disregarded the 
truth and necessity of the choice of the best in God as far 
as to say openly, confirmed by the facts, according to 
what they claim, that the infinitely good being is, by its 
nature, so far from being determined to choose the best, 
whether in duration, number, extent, perfection or any-
thing one likes, that in each of its works it has stayed infi-
nitely below what it could do, and nonetheless justifiably 
takes pleasure in them. 
On the other hand, all those who have felt how much 
the choice of the best is essential to the best being, have 
made the utmost efforts to offset the strange absurdity of 
establishing this world as the best world: and confirmed 
by the facts, according to what they likewise claim, they 
have argued, not that moral or physical evil is absolutely 
necessary in itself, but that it is necessary in the best 
world, so that if God made a world in which there were 
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no evils, as they admit he could (a world composed, for 
example, of as many Cherubim, holy and happy for etern-
ity, as there are beings of every kind in this one), then that 
world would be, albeit without comparison, less perfect 
than this one. 
Such are the monstrous opinions that have divided 
philosophy until today. Between these extremes there is 
no middle point, or one deemed worthy to recognize. 
Quemvis media erue turba [Pick any one you like from a 
crowd].58 Call, summon whoever you like, from the 
crowd of those who profess to believe in the existence of 
a very wise and very good God. You will not find anyone 
who, disposed to one or other of these two sides injurious 
to the God he professes, does not nobly stifle its extrava-
gance. Each sees the dreadful deformity of the opinion 
contrary to his own. He sees it like a lynx, and closes his 
eyes to the deformity of the one he embraces. One, how-
ever, is hardly better than the other... And we are aston-
ished that impiety holds the upper hand from one day to 
the next, in spite of so many writings issued against it! I 
am not astonished to see it derive more benefit from this 
scandalous ebb and flow of contradictory opinions on a 
subject said to be very clear and very luminous. 
I find the source of these pernicious opinions, against 
which we cannot speak out strongly enough, in the influ-
ence of a false theology, which has placed cruel obstacles 
to philosophers’ thoughts. This theology has generally 
been confused with religion. Those who shook off the 
yoke of one, also shaking off the yoke of the other and 
hastening into Pyrrhonism, have not taken the trouble to 
make use of the freedom they gained to release them-
selves from fundamental “truths.” All the others (without 
excluding those who are accused of being, or who pride 
themselves on being, the most free in their manner of 
thinking) have with the foundation of religion preserved a 
thousand theological prejudices; irreconcilable ideas, 
which had to be reconciled as best they could: an overly 
universal agent God; a power that acts on nothing as on 
something, and consequently independent of means; a 
power from then on responsible for all the good that is not 
done; a chimerical independence; freedom, immutability, 
and knowledge taken in very suspicious ways to extend 
beyond what is possible: on the other hand, goodness re-
strained infinitely below what is possible; an almost 
nominal goodness; I dare say, even in the very system of 
the partisans of optimism, and in the mouths of those who 
most exaggerate the best, the choice of the best, essential 
to the action of God. 
It is from this frightful labyrinth that I have made 
every effort to distance myself. I will subsequently give 
an exact account of the success to my readers, to whom it 
is sufficient to affirm in general, as a result, a God who is 
the author and creator of all good, stranger to all evil, and 
worthy of every last bit of our confidence and love. With-
out deciding against respectable articles, except where I 
suspect error, I will content myself with first proposing to 
judicious minds, which are not overburdened with preju-
dices, to examine with me the advantages and disadvan-
tages, if any, of this idea of God: 
 
An infinitely good, wise and powerful cause, to whom we are 
indebted, not absolutely for our being, a dangerous gift, but for 
our well-being, a real favour. A cause, about whom we have 
nothing to complain for making us pass (without our say so) 
from the tranquil state of non-being, where we ask for nothing 
and where we have no need for anything, to the frightful risks of 
being, either in this life or in another: but which, from the fright-
ful risks of being in which the nature of things plunges us, leads 
us, as fast as possible, to a sure state of felicity, by creating us, 
literally, by a exquisite creation; that is to say, by making us 
pass from misery to happiness, and from imperfection to perfec-
tion (which is incomparably more than from non-being to be-
ing). 
 
O God, worthy indeed of every last bit of our confidence 
and love! 
Nothing has contributed more to convince me of the 
need to open new paths, or to reopen old, neglected, long-
lost paths, than the question proposed by the Academy on 
optimism. I do not speak of the serious application, of 
which the examination of this multitude of pieces submit-
ted to us made me a duty; I mean of the character and the 
very opposition of the pieces. It cannot be denied that 
there were many estimable by their subtlety or by the 
depth of research, and the winning one was like this.59 But 
good God! In all of them, what opinions! In all of them, 
towards what extremities are we carried, determinedly, 
without looking behind us! Not the slightest attempt; not 
the slightest attempt at a mean between the opposing 
sides. Whichever side is chosen is endorsed entirely and 
with no turning back. 
I had suspected as much. It suited no one, least of all 
me, to claim as guide to those who entered this fray. 
However, I could try to inspire views, especially by doing 
it in such an indirect manner that no one spotted my inten-
tion. To this end I hastened to produce my Thoughts on 
Freedom,60 many of my Thoughts on Man,61 and my 
Treatise on Chance under the Rule of Providence,62 which 
even appeared in time, at the end of 1754.63 There, with-
out making an express mention of the subject of opti-
mism, as proposed by the Academy, I nonetheless present 
with some ingenuity all the light and all the shadows ne-
cessary to bring out the idea I wanted to see developed. 
These essays were not unknown to the authors of some of 
the pieces we received, but compliments, and critiques as 
fruitless as the compliments, are all I have drawn from 
them. The object I most cared about was not apparent. In 
vain is this object encountered in thirty passages, under 
various guises, and always underneath more prominent 
features. It has not occurred to anyone to bring these fea-
tures together, nor to honour with any discussion this doc-
trine sown in so many passages: 
 
God is as essentially all that he is as the triangle is angular, the 
circle is round, and two and two are four. God is as essentially 
good as intelligent. God loves and wills a greater good as essen-
tially as he knows this greater good, and he knows it essentially, 
indispensably, necessarily, logically, and metaphysically. What 
God wills, what God does, is therefore essentially, indispen-
sably, necessarily, logically, and metaphysically the best. But 
God does not do, God does not will, everything that is done and 
willed in the world. He does not do what others do; he does not 
will what others will; nor does he make—that is to say, he does 
not carry out—the wills of others; he does not carry out a will of 
theirs, at least a bad will: that surpasses the sphere of possibili-
ties. God wills all to be good, holy, and rational as is possible; 
only the essences of things are the limits of his good-will, as 
well as of his power. If God’s work is the best possible, is this 
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world therefore the best possible? We must draw a distinction. It 
is so in all that concerns the influence of God’s action. It is very 
far from being so in what results from the free actions of other 
beings. Let a being able to modify itself in a praiseworthy way 
modify itself in a criminal way; let a multitude, more or less 
great, of such beings do the same; the scene of the world is very 
different: its perfection and its imperfection change. This is not 
the fault of the very good and the very holy. He does not do the 
actions of others; it would be contradictory for him to do them. 
He does not modify that which modifies itself; it would be 
contradictory for him to modify it. He does not ordain evil or the 
lesser good, which is an evil. He does not incline or determine 
anything whatsoever. He does not in any way predestine. He 
does not decree anything except to reward as a king and punish 
as a father, as the situation requires. He does not permit evil, 
except in a very improper sense of the word permit, which 
would mean only not to prevent what the essences of things, in a 
very literal sense, do not permit one to prevent. He does not in 
any way influence the disorders that really are disorders, the 
evils that really are evils, which disturb and corrupt the mass; 
but he turns these evils, these disorders, which are not in any 
way in his power to suppress, to the greatest advantage of all 
beings. Impartial benefactor of all the beings there are, of each 
according to its nature from which he turns to the best account 
possible; source of all the good there is and will ever be, in a 
world infinite in extent and duration, he maintains, at each mo-
ment in this world, the best disposition that the essential free-
dom of beings, their malice, their wickedness, their imperfec-
tion, allows in each moment. At each moment his infinite wis-
dom, animated by boundless affection, intervenes with all the 
weight of his power and all the efficacy of his grace, to increase 
goods, reduce evils, cure, put right, relieve, and heal; to right 
wrongs, to heal the wounds that blind or wicked beings con-
stantly cause by mutual blows. If all is not better; if all is not 
holy and happy (confirmed by the facts, it is my turn to say this 
openly) it is because the thing is not yet possible: it is because it 
is possible only by development and by degrees and that it is a 
matter of leading beings to make themselves such rather than to 
make them such, which is absurd. If it were only a matter of 
willing them to be such for them to be all holy, happy, identified 
with God himself, infinite goodness would not hesitate, would 
not defer for a moment. Infinite goodness would hate a wisdom 
that would persuade her either that there is no best, although it 
was a possible course of action, or that it must not do this best, 
although the only cost to it is to will it: and even more would 
infinite goodness hate a superb independence which would be 
wounded by such a choice. 
 
This is not the twentieth part of the features of this nature 
I have sown in my essays, and this summary certainly re-
moves them far from the fire and energy they have in the 
very passages where the outpouring of my heart has dic-
tated them to me. People will conclude as much when 
they subsequently encounter them again; many will not 
delay doing so. It seemed to me that in a country in which 
these matters have been discussed more than elsewhere, 
and where one must keenly feel the need for new 
openings, the slightest sparks ought to have seized the at-
tention of the philosophers. The conjuncture of the prize, 
the number of competitors, the illustrious Academy which 
proposed the question; all this enhanced the hope I had 
conceived. 
What took me by surprise was that, out of this multi-
tude of pieces, there were none in which anyone wanted 
to acknowledge a middle point between these positions: 
the best world, and so much the best that one more good 
action or one less crime, one more happy person or one 
less unfortunate one, would have made it another world; 
possible for sure, but unworthy of supreme wisdom; this 
world, perverse and miserable... always good enough, in 
the eyes of a being who could put even more evils in it, 
and fewer goods, without anyone being entitled to com-
plain; a being, whose sovereign independence owes noth-
ing to puny beings. Everything boils down to this. And 
what is alleged in favour of the triumph of these consol-
ing doctrines? Facts, first of all: everyone pulls them to 
himself as best he can. He is only too sure by the fact that 
the world is as it is. But is it such because the infinite 
goodness does not see the better, or because it does not 
will the better, or for some other reason? The facts say 
nothing about that. 
People then throw themselves into a parade of the 
most hackneyed platitudes: on the one hand, about God’s 
wisdom, and on the other, about his independence. 
Wisdom! “Which really has insights we do not, from 
which it judges that all the beings of this world made holy 
and happy, as it could make them, immersed in the bosom 
of God, praising, blessing, cherishing God for eternity, 
would make a world less perfect than this one, and hence 
very unworthy of its choice.”64 Ah! I would have diffi-
culty believing it if I heard it from the very mouth of the 
Most High, because I would always doubt whether it 
would be him who spoke. How can I believe it from the 
mouths of men? No, never, even if it was ten thousand 
Popes and ten thousand Leibnizes who affirmed it! “An 
error,” it is said, “an error to imagine that it would be bet-
ter for all to be harmony in the physical world and for all 
to be virtue in the moral world. An error to pretend that 
the felicity and sanctity of creatures are the main goals of 
divine wisdom. No, it is the simplicity of means, it is the 
observation of general laws that it has for its principal 
goal.65 As few exceptions as possible; the least miraculous 
intervention is what charms divine wisdom.” Hey, who is 
thinking of taking away this charm? Who is asking for a 
miracle other than the unique miracle of creation, already 
supposed? The wish is only (if the miracle is real) that, 
without cost, difficulty, or effort, it would have taken a 
better course for us. With regard to God, then, was it fur-
ther from the non-existence of beings to their perfectly 
happy existence than from their non-existence to any ex-
istence whatsoever? Was it more difficult for him to say 
let everything be holy and happy, than to say let every-
thing exist? “General laws are needed, and the fewest 
possible exceptions to these laws.” Without a doubt. So I 
want only a good general law, all holy and happy, and no 
exceptions, not the slightest. “The greatest simplicity of 
means is needed.” Oh, nothing simpler than to will, for 
which one only has to will. One act of will in God is no 
more complicated than another. The act of creation is not 
subject to any means, the act of creation of a world where 
everything is only virtue and harmony is no more subject 
to means than the act of creation of a world full of crimes 
and disorders. If the idea of one is more complicated than 
the idea of the other, it is the concern of intelligence, 
which, moreover, of two worlds to chose from, embraces 
one neither more nor less than the other; but the will does 
not need more effort, and no more action is required in 
one case than in the other. Or, do we pretend that it is in 
the very beings that make up the world that there must be 
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the least action? If it is the least action relative to such-
and-such an effect, who would dispute you on that? But 
let the effect in question, the effect to be produced, there-
fore be to make all holy, all happy. As long as one is as-
sured or will admit that the thing is possible, and possible 
for the simple will of God, I declare that I do not change 
anything. If it is in the least action that lies the sublime, 
absolutely speaking, then keep all beings in complete in-
activity; plunge them into a lethargic sleep; moreover, let 
there be only a very small number of them brought into 
existence; even better, do not do it at all. 
This is what the profound Leibnizian school neither 
saw nor wished to see, though I had placed it in front of 
its eyes to the point of exciting its bad humour. Now let’s 
pass to the opposite extreme. 
Independence! The sovereign independence of God! 
Another matter for edifying declamations, carefully col-
lected by the other half of our competitors. That God is 
self-sufficient is first of all taken as a principle. So divine 
perfection finds all its fulfilment in God. So there is no 
perfection in God which has its fulfilment outside of him, 
not even goodness. But, it is objected, goodness is a pro-
pensity to do good. So God’s essential goodness essen-
tially assumes outside of God the existence of objects to 
which God can do good. I would add: therefore the infi-
nite goodness of God, the infinite propensity to do 
good—and what good? an infinite good; to whom? to an 
infinity of beings—essentially supposes an infinity of real 
and existing beings outside of God. “This is a mistake,” it 
is said. “God’s goodness is a completely different good-
ness from that. It is a goodness that has its complete ful-
filment without doing the slightest good to anyone. It sup-
poses the possibility of doing good to real beings, but it 
does not need these beings existing to be satisfied. They 
are present to the divine intellect from all eternity, and 
that is enough; their existence would do nothing more. 
Thus the existence of beings is merely indifferent to God, 
considered according to all his perfections. God wills 
everything that is good and perfect. Yes. But this is not to 
say that he wills it to exist. What an idea to imagine that 
he wills it! And why! It is of the utmost indifference to 
him whether there is more or less reality outside of him or 
whether there is any at all.”66 Reality: come, have cou-
rage! Instead of this dry term of ontology, say holiness, 
felicity. It goes straight to the heart; what’s the good of 
staying only in the mind? Let’s articulate. “It is of the ut-
most indifference to God whether there is more or less 
holiness and felicity outside of him or whether there is 
any at all.” Isn’t that what you mean? At least that’s 
what’s at issue. Man could have both more realities and 
other realities: let us say, man could be holy and happy 
forever, if it had pleased God, for his capacity in this re-
spect, you admit, is infinite. “However,” you add, “al-
though it did not please God to will it” (and that not be-
cause things would have been less perfect in this way, but 
because he did not want it, because it did not please him; 
do we need other reasons?), “we owe him no less sincere 
thanks for the gifts we have received from him with so 
much liberality. An infinitely good and infinitely power-
ful benefactor seriously wills the good of all his sub-
jects...” Sacred truths, which are no longer only insup-
portable jargon, as soon as they are connected to such 
doctrines! The infinite power that does only infinitely 
little for me – what does that matter to me? The infinite 
goodness that is indifferent towards everything which 
concerns me – what does that matter to me? “Liberality!” 
A strange beneficence, which is consummated in the con-
templation of an infinite good it can do to me and does 
not do to me! “It wants, oh so solemnly, the good of all its 
subjects.” How do I know that, when it does so little 
compared to what it could do? When every dispensation 
on its part is indifferent, arbitrary, literally fortuitous, 
having no motives, either in it or outside of it? A touching 
point of view, very suitable for exciting in prayer the 
transports of our love! 
Yet such is the doctrine, among others, of the piece 
the Academy crowned, to be sure without claiming to 
crown the doctrine itself; a distinction which is always 
supposed and of which it seems it ought to be unneces-
sary to point out. Thus, I confess, however revolted I am 
by this doctrine, I have nonetheless, following the light of 
my conscience, declared myself in favour of a piece 
which maintains it – shall I say it? – in a circumstance 
where the equality of voices, between this piece and an-
other one completely the opposite, gave to my weak vote 
an unexpected preponderance. It is because I believe that, 
in such occasions, it is neither the partisan spirit nor the 
attachment to our opinions, nor even entirely the nature of 
the opinions, which is entitled to persuade us, but the 
merit of the treatment of the subjects. Although a partisan 
of optimism, I was not upset to see it overcome in this 
meeting, even less since I would have difficulty in deter-
mining which of the two ways I felt most remote from, 
the one that was attacked or the one that was defended. 
Ultimately, perhaps monstrous opinions grafted onto a 
truth shock even more than when they are in their legiti-
mate relationship with error. 
This is more than enough to make it clear how much 
the question of optimism, or the choice of the best, re-
mains shrouded in darkness, and what powerful preju-
dices are opposed to what is agreed on this subject; that is 
to say, how far men are from understanding themselves 
when they profess that there is a God, an infinite good-
ness, an infinite wisdom, etc. I put off to the following 
pieces a few particular reflections which ought to have 
found a place at the end of this one.67 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 [André-Pierre Leguay de Prémontval], L’esprit de Fontenelle ou re-
cueil de pensées tirées de ses ouvrages (The Hague: Pierre Gosse, 
1744). 
2 André-Pierre Leguay de Prémontval, Memoires d’André Pierre Leguai 
de Prémontval, Professeur en Mathematiques et Belles-Lettres. The Ha-
gue: n.p., 1749. 
3 André-Pierre Leguay de Prémontval, Panagiana panurgica, ou le faux 
evangeliste (The Hague: Jean Neaulme, 1750). The title alludes to Tous-
saint’s oft-used pseudonym, Panage, although Les moeurs was published 
anonymously. 
4 [François Vincent Toussaint], Les moeurs (n.p.: n.p., 1748). 
5 André-Pierre Leguay de Prémontval, La monogamie, ou l’unité dans le 
mariage; ouvrage dans le quel on entreprend d’établir, contre le préju-
gé commun, l’exacte & parfaite conformité des trois loix, de la nature, 
de Moïse, & de Jesus-Christ, sur ce sujet, 3 vols. (The Hague: Pierre van 
Cleef, 1751-2). 
6 See André-Pierre Leguay de Prémontval, Vues Philosophiques; ou 
protestations et declarations sur les principaux objets des connoissances 
humaines, 2 vols. (Berlin: Joachim Pauli, 1757), I: 239-40. 
 
PRÉMONTVAL’S “GENERAL MISUNDERSTANDING ON THE QUESTION OF OPTIMISM” 
 
 329 
 
7 See Prémontval, Vues Philosophiques, I: 275. 
8 See Prémontval, Vues Philosophiques, I: 18-32. 
9 See Prémontval, Vues Philosophiques, I: 164-236, and II: 243-268. An 
English translation of the latter can be found in André-Pierre Leguay de 
Prémontval, The Philosophical Writings of Prémontval, ed. and trans. 
Lloyd Strickland (Lanham: Lexington, 2018), 1-10. 
10 The proof is to be found in Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, “Les 
loix du Mouvement & du repos, déduites d’un Principe Metaphysique,” 
in Histoire de l’Academie Royale des Sciences et Belles-lettres. Année 
MDCCXLVI (Berlin: Ambroise Haude, 1748), 267-294, and later in 
Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Essai de cosmologie (n.p.: n.p., 
1751). An English translation of the latter can be found in Proofs of God 
in Early Modern Europe, ed. and trans. Lloyd Strickland (Waco: Baylor 
University Press, 2018), 221-246. 
11 See André-Pierre Leguay de Prémontval, Pensées sur la Liberté, ti-
rées d’un ouvrage qui a pour titre: protestations et declarations philo-
sophiques sur les principaux objets des conoissances humaines (Berlin 
and Potsdam: Chrétien Frédéric Voss, 1754), and André-Pierre Leguay 
de Prémontval, “Remarque sur cette définition de M. Wolf du mot ali-
quid; aliquid est cui aliqua notio respondent. §54. de l’Ontologie. p. 
41,” in Histoire de l’Académie Royale des Sciences et des Belles-Lettres 
de Berlin MDCCLIV (Berlin: Haude and Spener, 1756), 440-443. En-
glish translations: Prémontval, The Philosophical Writings of Prémon-
tval, 11-56 and 145-148. 
12 See Prémontval, Vues Philosophiques, II: 269-306. English transla-
tion: Prémontval, The Philosophical Writings of Prémontval, 131-144. 
13 As it happens, the reason for Prémontval’s spurt of book publishing, 
namely his frustration early in 1754 at the Academy overlooking his 
work, evaporated soon after, as several of his memoirs from 1754, 1755, 
1757, and 1758 were selected for publication in the Academy’s procee-
dings for those years. 
14 See Johann Gottlieb Buhle, Literarischer Briefwechsel von Johann 
David Michaelis, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Weidmann, 1794), I: 96. 
15 Prémontval, Pensées sur la Liberté. 
16 André-Pierre Leguay de Prémontval, Le Diogene de d’Alembert; ou 
Diogene décent: pensées libres sur l’home & sur les principaux objets 
des conoissances de l’home (Berlin: n.p., 1754). 
17 André-Pierre Leguay de Prémontval, De Dieu et de la Religion: Suite 
du Diogene décent (Frankfurt: n.p., 1754). 
18 The two books were reissued together a year later under the title of Le 
Diogene de d’Alembert; ou Diogene decent. An English translation of 
selections from this work can be found in Prémontval, The Philosophical 
Writings of Prémontval, 63-73. 
19 André-Pierre Leguay de Prémontval, Du hazard sous l’empire de la 
providence (Berlin: J. C. Kluter, 1755). English translation: Prémontval, 
The Philosophical Writings of Prémontval, 75-129. 
20 See Buhle, Literarischer Briefwechsel, I: 96. 
21 See Buhle, Literarischer Briefwechsel, I: 142-143. 
22 The first volume was published in March 1757, the second in June. 
See Buhle, Literarischer Briefwechsel, I, 142-143. The two volumes 
were reprinted in 1761. 
23 Prémontval, Vues Philosophiques. 
24 Prémontval, Vues Philosophiques, I: xxvi. 
25 See [Anon.], Index librorum prohibitorum juxta exemplar romanum 
jussu sanctissimi domini nostri (Mechelen: P. J. Hanicq, 1838), 287-288. 
26 See the registers held by the Archiv der Berlin-Brandenburgischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften under the shelfmarks I IV 31/06 – I IV 
31/12. 
27 Prémontval even proposed the question for the 1759 prize essay, a 
question concerning the reciprocal influence of language and opinion. 
For further details, see Avi Lifschitz, Language & Enlightenment: The 
Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016). 
28 From the register for 7 June 1753 held by the Archiv der Berlin-
Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften under the shelfmark I 
IV 31/06, Bl. 48. 
29 Johann Christoph Gottsched, De optimismi macula diserte nuper 
Alexandro Popio anglo, tacite autem G. G. Leibnitio, perperam licet, 
inusta (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1753). 
30 [Gotthold Ephraim Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn], Pope—ein 
Metaphysiker! (Danzig: Johann Christian Schuster, 1755). 
31 See Cornelia Buschmann, “Die Philosophischen Preisfragen und Pre-
isschriften der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften im 18. 
Jahrhundert.” In Aufklärung in Berlin, ed. by Wolfgang Förster, 165-228 
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1989), 199. 
32 Namely [Martin Künzli], “Discours sur cette question, tout est-il bien? 
proposée par l’Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles Lettres de Ber-
 
 
lin, pour le prix de l’année 1755.” In Dissertation qui a remporté le prix 
proposé par l’Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles Lettres de Prusse, 
sur l’optimsme, avec les pieces qui ont concouru, 1-31 (Berlin: Haude 
and Spener, 1755). 
33 See Eduard Winter, Die Registres der Berliner Akademie der Wissen-
schaften 1746-1766 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1957), 58. 
34 Adolph Friedrich Reinhard, Le système de Mr Pope sur la perfection 
du monde, comparé à celui de Mr de Leibnitz, avec un examen de 
l’optimisme (Berlin: Haude and Spener, 1755), 29. 
35 Reinhard, Le système de Mr Pope sur la perfection du monde, 38. 
36 Reinhard, Le système de Mr Pope sur la perfection du monde, 41. 
37 Formey, “Dissertation qui a remporté le prix proposé par l’Académie 
Royale des Sciences et Belles Lettres de Prusse, sur l’optimsme, avec les 
pieces qui ont concouru,” Nouvelle bibliothèque germanique 18 (1756), 
22-32, especially 29-32. 
38 Immanuel Kant, “An attempt at some reflections on optimism by M. 
Immanuel Kant, also containing an announcement of his lecture for the 
coming semester 7 October 1759,” in Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Phi-
losophy, 1755-1770, eds. and trans. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67-76. 
39 “Know, then, that with the votes equal between your piece and ano-
ther, I – as much a supporter of optimism as I am – twice tipped the sca-
les on your side” (Prémontval, Vues Philosophiques, II: 69). The other 
piece Prémontval refers to here is likely the pro-optimism essay, [Kün-
zli], “Discours sur cette question.” Prémontval’s claim to be a supporter 
of optimism is not straightforward, as we shall see. 
40 Prémontval, Vues philosophiques, II: 67-74 and 75-136. Both pieces 
were subsequently republished in German translation along with a num-
ber of other pieces prompted by Reinhard’s winning essay; see Christian 
Ziegra, Sammlung der Streitschriften über die Lehre von der besten 
Welt, und verschiedene damit verknüpfte wichtige Wahrheiten, welche 
zwischen dem Verfasser der im Jahr 1755. von der Akademie zu Berlin 
gekrönten Schrift vom Optimismo, und einigen berühmten Gelehrten 
gewechselt worden (Rostock and Wismar: Berger and Boedner, 1759). 
41 See Francis MacDonald Cornford, trans., Plato’s Cosmology: The 
Timaeus of Plato (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 33 (Timaeus 29E-30A); 
Timaeus of Locri, On the Nature of the World and the Soul, trans. Tho-
mas H. Tobin (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985), 37-39. 
42 Also affirmed in other works, such as Pensées sur la Liberté, 38-49; 
Du hazard sous l’empire de la providence, 45-47. 
43 G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy, trans. E. M. Huggard (Chicago: Open Court, 
1985), 188, §118. 
44 Leibniz, Theodicy, 260, §211. 
45 See Reinhard, Le système de Mr Pope sur la perfection du monde, 36. 
46 The same argument can be found in Prémontval, Le Diogene de 
d’Alembert; ou Diogene décent: pensées libres sur l’home & sur les 
principaux objets des conoissances de l’home (Amsterdam: n.p., 1755, 
new ed.), 229. 
47 See for example Daniel A. Dombrowski, A History of the Concept of 
God: A Process Approach (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 2016), 56-57. 
48 See Prémontval, Memoires, 227. 
49 For example, one reviewer of Prémontval’s Vues Philosophiques 
complained that “The Christianity the author professes is very different 
from the Christianity Jesus Christ established. His writings offer us only 
a mangled Christianity, less suited to feature in the School of Jesus 
Christ than in an Academy of philosophers; in wanting to ease our faith, 
he continually upsets it.” [Anon.], “Vues Philosophiques ou Protesta-
tions & Declarations sur les principaux objets des connoissances humai-
nes, par Mr. de Prémontval,” Journal Encyclopedique, par une societé 
de gens de lettres. Pour le 15. Mai 1757. Tome IV. Premiere partie 
(Liege: Everard Kints, 1757), 28-40, at 36-37. 
50 For which see Dombrowski, A History of the Concept of God: A Pro-
cess Approach. Unfortunately, Dombrowski does not mention Prémon-
tval at all in his history of the process or neoclassical conception of God, 
despite the obvious overlap in views. Prémontval believed that God exi-
sted in time and that his knowledge did not extend to future events, 
which were genuinely undetermined and hence unknowable in advance. 
He also insisted that God is the creator only of the world’s order rather 
than the world per se, and that God is restricted to acting on the world 
by influence rather than by fiat. He believed that God undergoes change. 
Moreover, he also gestured at a dipolar notion of God. All of these 
views would later characterize the process or neoclassical conception of 
God. 
51 I would like to thank Daniel J. Cook for his helpful comments on a 
previous draft of this paper. 
52 From Prémontval, Vues philosophiques II, 32-66. 
 
LLOYD STRICKLAND 
 
 330 
 
53 Prémontval alludes here to his short story, “The false Minerva, or, the 
good judgement of Momus” in Prémontval, Vues Philosophiques, II: 10-
1810-18; English translation: http:// www. leibniz-translations.com/ mi-
nerva.htm . In this story, following complaints from the inhabitants of 
the Earth about the evils they endure, Minerva explains to the gods that 
in fact all was good [tout étoit bien], and that for all to be good there had 
to be innumerable evils of every kind. The gods accept her argument 
without understanding it, concluding that if the people of Earth were not 
content living in the so-called best possible world, despite its great quan-
tity of evils, they should be, a view which elicits derisive laughter from 
the character Momus. Momus was the Greek god of satire, mockery, 
blame, and criticism, famed for finding fault with everything. In presen-
ting Momus as a critic of optimism, Prémontval is probably thinking of 
fable 518 of Aesop: “The story goes that Zeus, Poseidon and Athena 
were arguing about who could make something truly good. Zeus made 
the most excellent of all animals, man, while Athena made a house for 
people to live in, and, when it was his turn, Poseidon made a bull. Mo-
mus was selected to judge the competition, for he was still living among 
the gods at that time. Given that Momus was inclined to dislike them all, 
he immediately started to criticize the bull for not having eyes under his 
horns to let him take aim when he gored something; he criticized man 
for not having been given a window into his heart so that his neighbour 
could see what he was planning; and he criticized the house because it 
had not been made with iron wheels at its base, which would have made 
it possible for the owners of the house to move it from place to place 
when they went travelling.” Aesop’s Fables, trans. Laura Gibbs (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 239. 
54 See Prémontval, Vues Philosophiques, I: 271-272. 
55 That is, Prémontval supposes that some people think it legitimate to 
conclude that this is the best of all possible worlds from the premise that 
God chooses the best among all possibles.  
56 See note 53. 
57 See Prémontval, Memoires, 227. 
58 From Horace, Satires I.4.25. 
59 That is, Reinhard’s Le système de Mr Pope. 
60 Prémontval, Pensées sur la Liberté. 
61 Prémontval, Le Diogene de d’Alembert. 
62 Prémontval, Du hazard sous l’empire de la providence. 
63 Prémontval’s note: “The title-page says 1755, but be aware that books 
which appear towards the end of a year bear the date of the next one. If 
need be, the literary gazettes of November and December 1754 would 
prove that this one had appeared. And, in fact, it was spoken about in 
one of the pieces sent to the Academy, as was the Pensées sur la Liber-
té, which was refuted by taking my thoughts in a very different spirit 
from what I intended.” The claim that Du hazard sous l’empire de la 
providence appeared in 1754 looks untrue. In a letter to a friend written 
in February 1755, Prémontval claimed that the book was still “15 days 
or 3 weeks” away from being printed. See Prémontval to Francois Tho-
mas Marie de Baculard d’Arnauld, February 21, 1755, unpublished let-
ter held by the Berlin Staatsbibliothek, Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Dar-
mstädter Collection. 
64 Prémontval is here articulating what optimists would say. 
65 Prémontval likely has Leibniz in mind here. In his Theodicy, Leibniz 
had claimed that “God can follow a simple, productive, regular plan; but 
I do not believe that the best and the most regular is always opportune 
for all creatures simultaneously.” Leibniz, Theodicy, 260, §211. 
66 Prémontval is now articulating what anti-optimists would say. Al-
though he likely has Reinhard in mind here, similar claims were also 
sometimes made by optimists. For example, in a work in which he ar-
gued that ours is the best of all possible worlds, Christian Wolff also 
claimed that God is sufficient unto himself and so indifferent as to whe-
ther to create or not. See Christian Wolff, Theologia naturalis, methodo 
scientifica pertractata. Pars prior, integrum systema complectens, qua 
existentia et attributa dei a posteriori demonstrantur (Frankfurt and 
Leipzig: n.p., 1736), 401-402 (§430). 
67 These pieces are: “Lettre à M. Adolphe Frideric Reinhard, Auteur de 
la Piece courounée par l’Academie en 1755” (Vues Philosophiques II, 
67-74) and “Remarques sur la Piece courounée par l’Academie en 1755” 
(Vues Philosophiques II, 75-136). 
